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We develop a two-stage model for versioning products with respect to both vertical and horizontal attributes. At first, a firm
positions its top-quality “flagship” product in a market with an imperfectly known distribution of tastes and reservation prices. In
the second stage, the firm learns these consumer characteristics and has the option of extending its product line by versioning the
flagship product using pure horizontal differentiation, quality degrading, or both. The firm's nonconvex versioning problem is
solved analytically for the two-product case. We find that ex ante extending the product line through vertical differentiation is
optimal for low marginal cost of quality (development cost); otherwise pure horizontal differentiation is superior. Given quasilinear
consumer preferences and a uniform distribution of consumer characteristics, versioning with respect to both horizontal and vertical
attributes is never optimal. Under delayed differentiation the optimal policy is contingent on the observed demand realization and
may lead to horizontal cannibalization and price dispersion for equal-quality products. The firm tends to increase its investment in
product quality unless it adopts a state-contingent policy of horizontal versioning for high and vertical versioning for low demand
realizations. Following a state-contingent policy, the optimal upfront development effort may be significantly lower than under full
ex-ante commitment. The option value of delayed differentiation is generally nonmonotonic in the firm's development cost.
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Information goods such as computer software or
electronic newspapers can be provided by firms at a low
marginal cost, though in many cases large capital outlays
are required to produce their first unit. The substantial
setup cost is driven mainly by the cost of developing the
top quality product. Having established this “flagship”
product, a firm can degrade it or in other ways modify it,
and in this way create a multitude of products with
different attributes at a small “versioning” cost. Infor-
mation goods are not the only products that enjoy such
cost complementarities in development. Component
standardization and design based on common platforms
can be found in a wide range of industries [35]. In
448 T.A. Weber / Decision Support Systems 44 (2008) 447–468addition, information goods are often bundled in with
physical goods, determining in part the functionality of
these underlying physical products. Therefore, finding
optimal versioning policies is becoming increasingly
important, as often lower distribution costs and new-
found customer intimacy render intricate second-degree
price discrimination strategies feasible. We present a
model of a firm that chooses a two-product portfolio
sequentially, when products can differ with respect to
both horizontal and vertical nonprice attributes. The firm
determines its second, or versioned product, after it has
completed the development of its flagship product, and
uncertainty over the market acceptance of the latter has
resolved.
It is well known that component sharing or, in a
broader sense, cost complementarities between products
can induce a firm to increase its product variety by
keeping the number of components necessary for their
assembly manageable [12]. On the other hand, over time
the creation of product variety should be commensurate
with the information available about demand, leading to
the practice of delayed differentiation [1,21,33]. Cost
complementarities and opportunities for delayed differ-
entiation are especially large for information goods:
provided a sufficiently modular product design, features
can be easily disabled or rebundled, leading to vertically
and horizontally differentiated versions of the initial
flagship product [32]. Since most of the development
effort goes into the design of the top quality product, the
optimal initial research effort and therefore ultimately the
choice of the flagship product's quality level depends on
the firm's options for creating a versioned product once
the market demand for the first product has been
observed.1 While this paper is not so much concerned
with the timing of product introductions [24], we are
interested in finding an optimal segmentation of a
heterogeneous customer base of multiple characteristics
both with and without delayed differentiation. We derive
the option value for delaying the versioning decision and
show that investment in product quality does not have to
be higher when this option is available.
All consumers are initially endowed with a budget and
personal taste. Each consumer of a certain (taste,budget)-
type has a utility, which depends on price, product
quality, and distance of the horizontal product attribute1 As an example, Microsoft's Office 2000 software was available in
at least four different versions (Premium, Professional, Small
Business, and Standard) essentially to segment the market and screen
the heterogeneous consumer base. These versions contained both
vertically (i.e., more vs. fewer features) and horizontally (i.e., disjoint
features) differentiating attributes.from one's own taste. Quality is a vertically differenti-
ating instrument and can be thought of as performance or
product breadth. If a product is characterized as a bundle
of features [20], then a product including more features
than another is of higher quality, whereas two products
with different bundles of features, not distinguished in
terms of performance or overall product breadth, can be
seen as horizontally differentiated. Each of them appeals
to consumer tastes “located” sufficiently close. Given a
distribution of consumer types (here assumed to be
uniform for simplicity), generated for instance by usage
preferences or existing standards, the firm can choose
product attributes so as to attract as many of the con-
sumers with a sufficiently large budget (i.e., potential
buyers) as possible. More specifically, the goal of the
risk-neutral firm is to create a certain number of product
offerings of the form (price, quality, horizontal product
attribute), such that its expected profits are maximized.
Each product offering targets a subset or segment of the
(taste,budget)-space, into which the consumers self-select
by choosing the product that maximizes their respective
utilities. However, at the outset the firm's ability to
optimize the choice of its portfolio is limited by imperfect
information about consumer characteristics. We assume
that this subjective uncertainty resolves after the creation
of its flagship product, which typically can be used to
evaluate demand. This creates an option value of de-
laying differentiation to reduce the firm's partially irre-
versible commitment to a particular product portfolio.
The underlying problem of multiattribute product
differentiation is highly nonconvex. We show that both
pure horizontal and pure vertical versioning are locally
optimal, whereasmixed versioning, i.e., the simultaneous
differentiation along both horizontal and vertical non-
price attributes, is ex ante never optimal in our quasi-
linear homogeneous setting. Pure vertical versioning is
globally optimal for relatively low development costs,
whereas for high development costs pure horizontal
versioning is superior. Under delayed differentiation the
optimal policy is contingent on the demand realization
(“state”). A consequence of this added flexibility may be
that the firm's optimal ex-ante investment in product
development may drastically drop, instead of increase as
a result of diminished (strategic) irreversibility of the
upfront sunk cost.
1.1. Literature review
Beginning with Hotelling's seminal paper on hori-
zontal competition [15], numerous contributions have
been made to product differentiation. The corresponding
literature can be divided into locational models in the
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“address” in product space, and so-called “non-address”
models in the spirit of Chamberlin's monopolistic com-
petition [8], where a representative consumer exhibits
(probabilistic) preferences for different products.2 An
important distinction between the two groups of models
is that in the latter group, each product is competing with
all others, while in the former consumers are truly
heterogeneous in their preferences, and some products
may have no overlap, i.e., may never be in direct com-
petition.3 In this paper we adopt the locational approach,
which in our view better captures consumer heterogene-
ity and allows the explicit consideration of participation
constraints that inevitably arise when dealing with a
spatial distribution of endowed unobservable consumer
characteristics. Our model is inspired by Salop's “circu-
lar city” [30], which we extend to a “cylinder” by adding
a vertical product characteristic.
Mussa and Rosen [25], based on earlier work by
Mirrlees [23], started a line of work on second-degree
price discrimination of multiproduct firms with quality
as the differentiating instrument. Cremer and Thisse
[10] demonstrate that in many setups horizontal dif-
ferentiation can be seen as a special case of vertical
differentiation. However, as our model contains both
horizontal and vertical features, it cannot be generally
mapped into either a pure horizontal or a pure vertical
one, as we shall see below. Jones and Mendelson [17]
show that for quality-differentiated information goods
and a uniform distribution of consumer types, no
differentiation is optimal.4 Our results do not confirm
these findings. Interpreting one consumer characteris-
tic as reservation price induces a type-dependent
participation (or “feasibility”) constraint: no consumer
can pay more than her reservation price. This par-
titions the consumer base into segments buying dif-
ferent products.
In addition to allowing the multidimensional screen-
ing of a heterogeneous consumer base [19,29], product
variety and broader product lines based on a modular
product design5 can help to delay differentiation along2 For a good bibliography see Refs. [2,4,34].
3 A notable exception in this dichotomy is the model in Ref. [27]
that combines characteristics from both locational and non-address
models, driven by symmetry assumptions in the preferences of a
representative consumer who is faced with localized products.
4 These results have been generalized by Ref. [6], which provides
sufficient conditions for goods with nonzero marginal costs and
general utility functions under which a stable, incentive-compatible
separation of the consumer base into segments can be reached.
5 Ref. [18] provides an excellent survey of the recent literature on
product development decisions.the supply chain [21,33]. The real-option value of de-
laying irreversible commitment to a full product line can
be seen in analogy to financial decision making [22]:
delaying irreversible investments can carry a significant
value, sometimes comparable to the investment volume
itself [28]. This option value is generally increasing in
the magnitude of the uncertainty unless, as Ref. [16]
shows, imperfectly correlated risks from different
sources are pooled, potentially decreasing the value of
managerial flexibility. We restrict ourselves to what [16]
terms “market payoff variability,” a single risk class,
and thus circumvent this effect. Examining the real-
option value of delaying the product versioning until –
with release of the flagship product – overall demand
has been observed, we find that it is generally non-
monotonic in the cost of quality β. Naturally, the option
value depends in an important manner on the perfor-
mance of the default ex-ante versioning policy, and is
therefore not necessarily monotonic in the amount of
uncertainty over all β's. This points to resource flexi-
bility as a driver of this option value [36]. Delaying
differentiation does not generally allow one to reverse
the upfront quality investment. Being able to make
product-line-extension and pricing decisions contingent
on the observed demand carries significant value
depending on the firm's default policy. For instance
for development costs, β, close to zero when the irre-
versibility of the investment in flagship quality is not
very significant, the option to delay differentiation car-
ries a high value. In fact we show that it is locally
maximal at β=0. The effects of increased versioning
flexibility on upfront investment in product develop-
ment as well as on consumer surplus are ambiguous. We
provide an example where delayed differentiation
leads to a lower flagship quality as a result of a state-
contingent policy where the mode of differentiation
depends on the observed demand realization, which is
generally the case if the dispersion in the firm's prior
beliefs about demand is large. For very little demand
uncertainty, the versioning mode is generally “locked
in” ex ante, and the delay in the differentiation allows
slight improvements on the previous pricing and posi-
tioning decisions. Consumer surplus depends both on
the actual product development costs as well as on the
chosen mode of product differentiation, and thus may
vary in both directions when introducing an option to
delay the versioning decision. To the best of our
knowledge this paper, based on Ref. [37], provides a
first complete analytical treatment of multiattribute
versioning combining horizontal and vertical differen-
tiation. We further extend this new approach to account
for demand uncertainty by deriving optimal state-
Fig. 1. Consumer utilities and resulting market segments (q1Nq2).
6 This model generalizes the common setup of “circular city”
models in the spirit of Ref. [30], which are used to describe pure
horizontal differentiation, typically to avoid the endpoint effects in
Hotelling's “linear city.” We have chosen the cylindrical setup for the
mixed-differentiation model with precisely this in mind.
7 General conditions for the additive separability of utility functions
in budget have been provided by Ref. [14]. Instead of κq it is possible
to incorporate any nonlinear strictly increasing quality measure ϕ(q)
which simply corresponds to a rescaling (cf. also Eq. (4)).
8 Without loss of generality the marginal utility of taste differences
|v− z| can be normalized to one, even when the cylinder circumference
2V (for some VN0) is not precisely known. Varying V changes the
relative marginal valuation of taste mismatch. By substitutingW′=W /V
for W and using an appropriate prior probability density g of W′
(instead of f ) one obtains the same results as the ones derived for the
unit cylinder V W, up to a constant factor. Thus, the results in this
paper do also hold when both maximum reservation price and extent of
the taste domain are ex-ante uncertain.
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mation goods are chosen here for mere convenience.
Everything in this paper equally applies to goods with
positive marginal costs (cf. Section 4.4).
1.2. Outline
In the following section we introduce the basic model
together with some structural simplifications that can be
made without loss of any generality. In Section 3 we
examine the ex-ante versioning case in which both
flagship and versioned product are chosen simultaneously.
We show that mixed versioning is never optimal and that
investment in quality increases with estimated demand.
Section 4 covers the case where the firm possesses the
option to delay product versioning until after demand has
realized. We determine the optimal versioning policy and
compute the option value of delayed differentiation in this
context. We also show that investment in product quality
under delayed differentiation may either increase or
decrease using a state-contingent horizontal–vertical
versioning policy. Section 5 discusses the results and
concludes with directions for further research.
2. The model
Let all consumers be distributed uniformly on
V W, where V ¼ R=2Z and W ¼ ½0;W  denote the
sets of tastes and budget levels, WN0 the maximum
reservation price, and R, Z the sets of reals and
integers. The (quotient) space R=2Z corresponds to an
interval [0, 2] with the points 0 and 2 identified, so that
V W is a cylinder of radius 1 /π and of height W (cf.Fig. 1).6 The parameter W represents the maximum
reservation price and is initially only imperfectly known,
in terms of a bounded measurable probability density
function f with compact support SoRþþ. We assume
that any information product offered can be uniquely
described in terms of its attributes, price p, nonnegative
quality q, and taste zaV. The utility of a consumer of
type ðv;wÞaV W who buys a product of attributes (p,
q, z) is assumed to be additively separable of the form
w−p+κq− |v−z|, and equal to w if she does not buy
the product.7 The positive constant κ defines the mar-
ginal valuation of quality relative to the other product
attributes, price and taste.8 This consumer can only
afford the product if her reservation price (disposable
budget) w is at least equal to the price p of the product,
p V w: ð1Þ
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malization constant for the consumer density is 1 / (2W).
The total budget in the set V W isW / 2, independent of
the diameter of the cylinder.
2.1. Change of variables
To simplify some of the discussions that follow, we
introduce the new variable u=κq−p, so that consumer
utility can be written in the form w+u− |v−z|. The new
variable u represents the net utility gain at perfect
horizontal fit. Using this simple change of variables,
consumer utility becomes independent of price. The
participation constraint (i.e., for any consumer the utility
obtained for the product has to weakly exceed utility for
budget w) can be written as
jv zj V u: ð2Þ
Any optimization of the product portfolio at the firm
level needs to account for the feasibility and participation
constraints (1)–(2) as well as incentive compatibility in the
sense that each consumer's choice is utility maximizing.
2.2. Cost structure
Throughout most of this paper we consider informa-
tion goods with zero marginal cost, which simplifies the
closed-form solutions. This assumption is not crucial and
all results can be easily generalized to goods with positive
marginal cost, as is shown in Section 4.4. For information
goods, the costs of reproduction and distribution are
indeed very small, so that this has become a standard
assumption in much of the extant literature.9 The cost βq
of creating the flagship product depends linearly on the
quality q, and can be written in the new variables as
Cð p; uÞ ¼ b
j
ð pþ uÞ; ð3Þ
where β is a positive constant.Without loss of generality it
is possible to set
j ¼ 1; ð4Þ
as the results for any arbitrary value of κN0 can be
recovered by substituting everywhere β′=β /κ for β. The
weight κ in the utility function has the sole effect of
scaling the firm's quality cost. In everything that follows
we therefore assume that Eq. (4) holds.9 Information goods are chosen here merely to keep analytical
complexity as low as possible. Of course, there are settings for which
the small, but nonzero, nature of the marginal costs matters, such as in
deriving asymptotic properties of large bundles of information goods
[3,13].2.3. Versioning problem
After having created the flagship product, the risk-
neutral firm has the option to create a versioned product by
varying product attributes in the following admissibleways:
(a) horizontal version (i.e., same quality, different taste)
at a cost αH≥0,
(b) vertical version (i.e., lower quality, same taste) at a
cost αV≥0,
(c) mixed version (i.e., lower quality, different taste)
at a cost αM∈ [max{αH , αV}, αH+αV].10
This cost structure exhibits strong cost complementa-
rities or economies of scope [26], as development costs
are incurred only once to create the flagship product.11
The firm maximizes profits subject to the consu-
mers' choice and participation. Solutions to this profit-
maximization problem exhibit translation invariance:
profits will not change by just horizontally translating all
products, as a direct consequence of the circular sym-
metry. One can therefore arbitrarily fix the horizontal
location of the first product to zero. Any implied solution
then naturally represents an entire equivalence class of
solutions to the more general problem with arbitrary
horizontal location of the first product.
2.4. Demand estimation
As has been pointed out above, the demand para-
meter W is initially only imperfectly known to the firm
(cf. also footnote 8). For any product of price p the profit
function depends on W through the marginal revenue
density p(W−p) / (2W). By replacing the random value
W with a nonlinear estimator Ŵ=(E [1 /W])−1 we
obtain the expected marginal revenue density. The
following technical lemma will be used throughout the
paper without special mention.
Lemma 1. (i) E [p(W−p) / (2W)]=p (Ŵ−p) / (2Ŵ).
(ii) ŴbW¯, where W¯=E(W).
The first part of this result is trivial but useful, as it
allows replacing the imperfectly known W with the
nonrandom Ŵ when computing expected profits. Part
(ii) indicates that when maximizing expected profits,
uncertainty in W prompts the firm to use as decision-10 This condition can also be written in terms of the r-norm of the
row vector (αH, αV), i.e., αM=||(αH, αV)||r=(αH
r +αV
r )1/r for r∈ [1, ∞)
and αM=||(αH, αV)||∞=max{αH, αV} for r=∞.
11 A multiproduct cost structure of this form has also been proposed
by Ref. [31].
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is always strictly (and sometimes substantially) lower
than the expected maximum reservation price Ŵ.12 Our
demand specification for the single-product firm corre-
sponds to a linear demand curve
Dð p; uÞ ¼ ð1 ðp=W ÞÞminf1; ug
with random intercept at WN0. The demand elasticity
p / (W−p) is independent of the consumers' net utility
uN0. The demand specification considered here is
somewhat nonstandard, since the consumer heterogene-
ity is with respect to their horizontal location and their
income, while much of the extant literature has empha-
sized consumer heterogeneity with respect to horizontal
location and marginal valuation of product quality.
3. Ex-ante versioning
3.1. Benchmark: Single-product firm
Before solving the multiproduct case we briefly dis-
cuss the single-product monopoly as a benchmark. With-
out loss of generality we can set z1=0, in view of the
translation invariance discussed above. With this the
expected single-product monopoly profit Π¯1(p1, u1)=
E[Π1( p1, u1; W )] as a function of ( p1, u1) becomes
C¯1ðp1; u1Þ ¼ p1ðWˆ  p1Þ
Wˆ
minfu1; 1g  bðp1 þ u1Þ:
It is clear that u1
⁎≤1, since ∂u1Π¯( p1, u1)b0 for any
( p1, u1)∈ (0, Ŵ)× (1, ∞). By virtue of the linearity of
the profit function in u1
⁎∈ [0, 1] maximum profits are
achieved for u1
⁎∈{0, 1}, so that
ðp⁎1 ; u⁎1 Þ ¼ ðWˆ ð1 bÞ=2; 1Þ; if b V 1;ð0; 0Þ; if b N 1:

ð5Þ
Thus, the single-product firm would like to achieve
“full horizontal market coverage” (i.e., q1
⁎=1+p1
⁎),
whenever it decides to enter the market.13
Proposition 1. (i) The optimal expected profit of the
single-product firm is
C¯⁎1 ¼
Wˆ
4
ð1 bÞ2  b; ð6Þ12 The relative difference between W¯ and Wˆ can become arbitrarily
large, as can the relative difference in the corresponding profits (when
using W¯ instead of Wˆ ). As an example, consider a uniform distri-
bution of W on an interval [ε, 2−ε] with 0bεb1. Then W¯=1 for all
ε∈ (0, 1), while Wˆ goes to zero as ε→0+.
13 This result is driven by the linearity of the cost function. In the
case where the cost function is strictly convex, say, of the form βq2,
there may exist interior solutions, making it impossible to derive
closed-form solutions in the multiproduct case.increasing in Ŵ and decreasing in β. (ii) The single-
product firm enters the market if and only if
Wˆ N
4b
ð1 bÞ2 : ð7ÞRelation (7) is a viability condition that imposes a
lower bound on the maximum-reservation-price estima-
torŴ as a function of β. In what follows we will use the
optimal expected single-product monopoly profits as a
benchmark for the performance of the various differen-
tiation modes in a multiproduct setting.3.2. Ex-ante product differentiation
Due to the symmetry of the problem it is possible,
without any loss in generality, possible to set z1=0 and to
restrict z2 to the interval [0, 1] (otherwise just switch
products and translate). Any solution satisfying these
constraints defines an equivalence class of solutions to
the versioning problem. There is one further simplifica-
tion, which directly results from the linearity of the
problem in z2. Indeed, the optimal value of z2 must be at
an extremity of [0, 1], i.e., z1
⁎∈{0, 1}. The induced two
canonical cases of vertical and horizontal differentiation
have to be distinguished in the solution to the versioning
problem. Furthermore we assume that the quality of the
second product does not exceed the quality of the first
product (q1≥q2), which after a linear variable transfor-
mation (u=κq−p) can be equivalently written in the
form
q1 ¼ p1 þ u1 z p2 þ u2 ¼ q2: ð8Þ
This assumption expresses the fact that in order for a
“versioning” policy to be meaningful, the first (flagship)
product has to be of higher quality than the derived
product. Fig. 2 provides an overview of the various
modes of differentiation that can arise: (1) no differen-
tiation (z2=0, q1=q2), which is de facto equivalent to the
single-product monopoly; (2) pure vertical differentia-
tion (z2=0, q1Nq2); (3) mixed differentiation (z2=1,
q1Nq2); and, (4) pure horizontal differentiation (z2=1,
q1=q2). To simplify the exposition, we will first set
versioning costs to zero, as their effect can be analyzed
separately once all the main expressions for the zero-
versioning cost base case have been established.
3.2.1. Pure vertical differentiation
The profit function Π¯V is linear in u1 and u2, so that
we can concentrate on the situation when u1=u2=1,
since otherwise the firm would only enter with one
Fig. 2. Modes of differentiation.
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problem can be written in the form
max
p1;p2
C¯Vð p1; p2Þ
¼ max
p1;p2
1
Wˆ
ð p1ðWˆ  p1Þ þ p2ð p1  p2ÞÞ  bð p1 þ 1Þ
 
;
ð9Þ
the solution of which yields the unique interior maxi-
mizers, p1
⁎=2Ŵ (1−β) /3 and p1⁎=Ŵ (1−β) /3, provided
that βb1. Optimal expected profits are then
C¯⁎V ¼
Wˆ
3
ð1 bÞ2  b ¼ C¯⁎1 þ
Wˆ
12
ð1 bÞ2; ð10Þ
strictly greater than single-product monopoly profits Π¯1⁎.
Thus, pure vertical differentiation strictly dominates a
single-product monopoly, given that versioning costs αV
are small enough. Pure vertical differentiation is ex-ante
viable if and only if
Wˆ N
3b
ð1 bÞ2 : ð11Þ
It is important to note that since u1
⁎=u2
⁎ at the
optimum in pure vertical differentiation, a consumer of
type (v, w) obtains equal surplus from both products.
This follows from the latent assumption that in
equilibrium consumers buy the higher-price product
if this yields exactly the same utility as the lower-price
product (e.g., since resale value is higher also). If this
were not the case, the firm could technically achieve
stable separation by letting u1
⁎=u1
⁎+ ε for any (arbi-trarily small) εN0 without, in the limit, changing
any of the results. The fundamental reason for the
stable segmentation of the consumer population lies
in the feasibility constraint (1): consumers never
spend more than their budget w (reservation price)
permits.
3.2.2. Mixed differentiation
In analogy to the single-product monopoly, profits
Π¯M only depend linearly on u1 and u2 (implying full
horizontal coverage). Since the constraint (8) is by
assumption not binding, it is u1=u2=1. The profit-
maximization problem thus takes the form
max
p1;p2
C¯Mð p1; p2Þ ¼max
p1;p2
f 12Wˆ ð p1ðWˆp1Þ þ p2ðWˆp2Þ
þp2ðp1  p2ÞÞ  bðp1 þ 1Þg:
ð12Þ
Straightforward unconstrained maximization yields
the optimal prices p1
⁎=Ŵ (5−8β) /7 and p2⁎=Ŵ (3−2β) /
7, which are well defined (i.e., in [0, Ŵ ] and such that
p1
⁎Np2
⁎) for any positive βb1/3. Optimal expected profits
are
C¯⁎M ¼
Wˆ
7
5
4
 2b
 2
þ Wˆ
16
 b ¼ C¯⁎1 þ
9Wˆ
28
1
3
 b
 2
;
ð13Þ
strictly increasing inŴ and strictly decreasing in β. In the
mixed-differentiation mode, the multi-product monopo-
list enters if and only if
Wˆ N
b
1
7
5
4 2b
 2þ 116 ; and b b
1
3
: ð14Þ
Given entry in mixed-differentiation mode, quality
dispersion does in general occur, since by construction for
βb1/3 that q1
⁎=Ŵ (5−8β) /7+1≥Ŵ (3−2β) /7+1=q2⁎.
However, vertical differentiation strictly dominates mixed
differentiation. Indeed,
C¯⁎V  C¯⁎M ¼ Wˆ
ð1 bÞ2
3
 1
7
5
4
 2b
 2
 1
16
 !
¼ Wˆ 1
20
 5
21
b 1
10
 2 !
N 0
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mode does not play a role, which by itself is an interesting
fact.
Proposition 2. For any given viable market configu-
ration (β, Wˆ) either pure horizontal or pure vertical
differentiation is optimal.
Mixed versioning is dominated by pure vertical dif-
ferentiation. As soon as goods are horizontally differen-
tiated with (z2=1), it is best to reduce the quality of the
flagship product so as to economize on providing costly
horizontal coverage with each product. Hence, leaving
slack in constraint (8) does not fully utilize the potential
of the flagship product, whose quality will ex ante be
reduced until q1=q2, i.e., until pure horizontal differen-
tiation is obtained.
3.3. Pure horizontal differentiation
In this mode constraint (8) is binding, so that q1=q2
or in other words
u1 ¼ u2 þ p2  p1: ð15Þ
Expected profits are C¯H ¼ 12Wˆ p1ðWˆ  p1Þð1þ u1

u2Þ þ p2ðWˆ  p2Þð1 u1 þ u2Þ þminfp1; p2gjp2 p1j
ðu1 þ u2  1ÞÞ  bð p1 þ u1Þ or, using Eq. (15),
C¯H ¼ 1
2Wˆ ðp1ðWˆ  p1Þð1 p1 þ p2Þ þ p2ðWˆ  p2Þð1þ p1  p2Þ
þmaxfp1ð p2  p1Þ; p2ð p1  p2Þgð2u2 1p1þ p2ÞÞ
 bð p2 þ u2Þ;
ð16Þ
subject to p2∈ [ p1−1, p1+1]∩ [0, Ŵ ] and u2∈ [(1+p1−
p2) /2, 1]. Thus, depending on the sign of ∂u2C¯H ¼
1
Wˆ
maxfp1ðp2  p1Þ; p2ð p1  p2Þg  b, either u2=1 (for
∂u1 Π¯HN0) or u2=(1+p1−p2) /2 (for ∂u1 Π¯Hb0). In the
latter case there is no overlap between the two products,
which we term “separation” (cf. Fig. 3). In the case where
u2=1, there clearly is “overlap,” and relation (15) entails
that then p1≥p2. It is clear that overlap in practice means
horizontal “product cannibalization,” for some consu-
mers are offered an individually rational choice (satisfy-
ing Eqs. (1)–(2)) between both products. It turns out that
under ex-ante versioning horizontal overlap is never
optimal, as the firm can do better by either eliminating
cannibalization or purely vertically differentiating. This
finding does not hold under delayed differentiation,
where horizontal cannibalization may be optimal as thebest possible “compromise” for certain intermediate
demand realizations.
Proposition 3. Let the parameters 0bβb1 and Wˆ N0 be
given.
(i) Horizontal differentiation with separation yields
optimal expected profits of
C¯⁎H1 ¼
Wˆ
4
ð1 bÞ2  b
2
¼ C¯⁎1 þ
b
2
; ð17Þ
with symmetric product portfolio (pk⁎, qk⁎)= (Ŵ (1−β) /
2, (1+Ŵ (1−β)) / 2, for k=1, 2.
(ii) There is no horizontal product cannibalization,
i.e., optimal expected profits Π¯H2
⁎ under horizontal
differentiation with overlap are dominated,
C¯⁎H2 ¼ bmax C¯
⁎
H1
; C¯⁎V
n o
¼ C¯⁎: ð18ÞWhen considering only horizontal differentiation,
Proposition 3 implies that product cannibalization is
not inherently ruled out, which may seem counterin-
tuitive in our simple setting. In fact, for lower unit cost
of quality β overlap (i.e., product cannibalization)
performs better than separation, which only yields
a constant improvement of β / 2 over single-product
optimal profits Π¯1
⁎. Cannibalization implies an
overinvestment in quality in the sense that more
quality is provided than necessary for full horizontal
coverage of the consumer base. Exploiting the
consumers’ feasibility constraint it is possible (for
low β) to achieve a vertical separation of the consumer
base offering one product at a lower price than the
other. The high-price product is then solely preferred
by high-w consumers of very good horizontal fit. This
feature of the model explains the possibility of price
dispersion in a purely horizontally differentiated
market when the marginal cost of creating additional
quality is sufficiently low. The following result sum-
marizes the firm's entry decision into the market in the
absence of an option to delay product differentiation
(cf. Fig. 4).
Proposition 4. Consider a firm that has the option to
enter the market, given (β, Wˆ)∈ (0, 1)×S, with one or
two information goods.
(i) For any (β, Wˆ) such that
2b=ð1 bÞ2 b Wˆ ; ð19Þthe firm's entry is viable if versioning costs are
small enough.
Fig. 3. Horizontal separation and overlap in terms of consumers' net utility.
455T.A. Weber / Decision Support Systems 44 (2008) 447–468(ii) In the case that Eq. (19) does not hold, the firm's
entry is not viable, even if versioning costs are
zero.
(iii) If entry is viable and Wˆb4β / (1−β)2, then the firm
needs to enter the market with two products.
An interesting implication from the last proposition is
that in some markets for information goods that are un-
profitable for any single product, a firm may still be able
to enter profitably with a versioned portfolio of products.
3.4. Effect of versioning costs
We have seen above that under perfect information
mixed differentiation is strictly dominated by pure vertical
differentiation. Thus, we can limit ourselves to adjusting
and comparing expressions (6), (10), and (29). As a
consequence of the earlier discussion, write Π¯H⁎ (instead
of Π¯H1*) for the optimal profits under pure horizontal
differentiation (separation). Following Eq. (29), pure
horizontal differentiation is dominated by single-product
monopoly if and only if αHNβ /2. On the other hand, it is
dominated by pure vertical differentiation if and only ifFig. 4. Optimal ex-ante product versioning.aV b aH þ Wˆ12 ð1 bÞ2  b2. The resulting partition of the
(αH, αV)-plane is depicted in Fig. 5.
4. Delayed differentiation
Assume that the risk-neutral firm can delay the
versioning decision until after the demand uncertainty
has resolved through introduction of the flagship pro-
duct. The exact timing proceeds over two stages (t∈{1,
2}): at t=1 the firm develops its flagship product of
fixed14 attributes (q1, z1) and presents it to the market
without collecting revenues. In the second stage (t=2)
firm learns the true value for the maximum reservation
price W, decides about introducing a versioned product
of nonprice attributes (q2, z2), and prices both products at
p1, p2 respectively. As a result, the firm needs to choose
its product portfolio such that its ex-ante expected profits
achieve
C¯⁎⁎ ¼ max
q1
E maxfC⁎Vðq1;W Þ;C⁎Hðq1;W Þg
 	
 
ð20Þ
instead of the Π¯⁎=max{Π¯V
⁎
, Π¯H
⁎
} it obtains under ex-
ante versioning according to Proposition 3. We solve this
problem in stages, beginning with the second stage.
4.1. Optimal ex-post versioning
Assume the firm has observed the realization of W
and has decided about the quality q1 of its flagship
product. As in Section 3, it is possible to differentiate the
versioned product either vertically (z2=0) or horizontally
(z2=1), provided that its quality does not exceed the14 Quality upgrades are not possible for tN1, since e.g., the
development team has been disbanded or upfront costs to restart
significant quality improvements are prohibitive. The firm never has
an incentive to change the horizontal nonprice attribute of the flagship
product, z1=0.
Fig. 5. Optimal modes of ex-ante differentiation for versioning cost
tuples (αH, αV)≥0.
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Alternately the firm has the option not to introduce a
vertically versioned product at all.15
4.1.1. Pure vertical differentiation
Consider the case when z2=0 and the resulting
portfolio contains two products. Without loss of generality
we can assume that u1⁎=u2⁎=q1−p1⁎, since – as long as
they are free – larger values for u weakly increase profits.
The profit-maximization problem becomes
max
p1;p2
CVð p1; p2; q1;W Þ
¼ max
p1;p2
p1ðW  p1Þ þ p2ð p1  p2Þ
W
minf1; q1  p1g  bq1
 
with solution equivalent to that of the ex-ante versioning
problem, as long as q1 is large enough so that full
horizontal coverage holds. If on the other hand q1 is small
compared to the realization W, then horizontal coverage
will not be full and product breadth is traded for the ability
to charge high prices. In other words, “transportation
costs” for consumers with significant misfit will be too15 The firm could also reprice the first product out of the market (at
p1≥W) and vertically version a second product, which is, however,
strictly inferior when the versioning cost αV is positive. If the firm does
not introduce the second product at all, then it needs to solve maxp1′∈[0,W]
p′1 (W−p1′) min{1, q1−p1′}, with solution p′1⁎ that can be obtained by
replacing W with 3W / 4 in Eq. (21). The firm does not incur a
versioning cost, so that at least for large αV not introducing a second
product is optimal, given that vertical differentiation is considered. If on
the other hand αV=0 (or αVN0, but small enough), then introducing
the versioned product in the second round is a good idea, since it can
always be accomplished by setting p2=0.high to buy any of the products. More specifically we
obtain (p2⁎, q2⁎)=(p1⁎ /2, q1−p1⁎/2), and
p⁎1 ¼
2W=3; if q1 z 1þ2W=3;
q11; if q1a½q¯VðW Þ; 1þ2W=3;
ð4W þ3q1
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð4W 3q1Þ2þ12Wq1
q
Þ=9; otherwise:
8><
>:
ð21Þ
where q¯VðW Þ ¼ 6þ 2W 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
9þ 4W 2p =3a½1;minf2; 1þ
2W=3g. From this one can derive an expression for the optimal
profits as a function of q1,
C⁎Vðq1;W Þ ¼
W=3 bq1; if q1 z 1þ 2W=3;
ðq1  1Þ 1 3ðq1  1Þ4W
 
 bq1; if q1a½q¯VðW Þ; 1þ 2W=3;
p⁎1 1
3p⁎1
4W
 
ðq1  p⁎1 Þ  bq1: otherwise:
8>><
>>:
ð22Þ
Due to the cost complementarities a versioned product
will always be introduced as long as the versioning cost
αV is small enough. The development cost for the flagship
product is already sunk and a second product can then
only increase profits (at least as long as αV, αH are small
enough). It is straightforward to show that for any WN0
the profit function ΠV⁎ (q1; W ) is continuously dif-
ferentiable in q1N0 with ∂q1C⁎Vð0Þ ¼ ∂q1C⁎Vð1þ 2W=
3ÞÞ ¼ b b ∂q1C⁎Vðq¯VÞ ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
4W 2 þ 9p  3ð Þ =ð2W Þ b.
In addition, the state-contingent profit functionΠV⁎ has at
most one maximum in q1N0 but is generally not
quasiconcave.16
4.1.2. Horizontal differentiation (including mixed)
When deciding to horizontally differentiate, the firm
chooses z2=1 and then needs to decide about p1, p2 and
q2=u2+p2≤u1+p1=q1. As in the ex-ante versioning
problem (cf. Section 3) there are two general cases,
“separation” and “overlap.” The details of the overlap
case, which is synonymous with “horizontal product
cannibalization,” are discussed in the Appendix, where
analytical solutions are provided. Under delayed differ-
entiation it is indeed sometimes best to horizontally
cannibalize products, whereas this is never optimal under
ex-ante versioning (Proposition 5). Independent of the
versioning costs, it is never optimal to version along both
horizontal and vertical attributes at the same time.17
There are four possible configurations that all exhibit
horizontal separation, depending on how large the16 It is also locally maximal at q1=0, as ∂q1 Π¯V
⁎ |q1=0=−βb0.
17 This finding is somewhat driven by the quasi-linearity of the
model in preferences and the assumption that the consumers are
uniformly distributed. Including nonlinearities in the consumers'
preferences, interior solutions favoring simultaneous differentiation
with respect to more than one attribute cannot be ruled out.
18 It is clear that horizontal differentiation with overlap can never be
the result of a non-state-contingent versioning policy.
457T.A. Weber / Decision Support Systems 44 (2008) 447–468quality q1 is with respect to the demand realization W:
(i) if q1≥1+W /2 (i.e., q1−p1≥1), given separation there
is just one product and p1⁎=W /2 analogous to the single-
product firm. (ii) If 1 /2≤q1−p1=1− (q2−p2)b1, then
ðp⁎1 ; p⁎2 Þ ¼ argmaxp1;p2 f p1ðW  p1Þðq1  p1Þ2W
þ p2ðW  p2Þð1 q1 þ p1Þ
2W
 bq1g ¼ W2 ;W2
 
;
for q1∈ [(1+W) /2, 1+W /2]. Note that in this case
q2⁎=1+W−q1, resulting in mixed differentiation without
price dispersion. (iii) If q1∈ [q¯H(W), (1+W) /2], then
p1⁎=p2⁎=q1−1/2, and q2⁎=q1 (pure horizontal differen-
tiation). Thereby q¯HðW Þ ¼ 2þW 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þW 2p =2a
½1=2;min f1; ð1þW Þ=2g. (iv) If q1−p1b1− (q2−p2)
(equivalent to q1−p1b1/2), then p1=p2 and q1=q2, since
the situation is symmetric (pure horizontal differentiation).
We have
p⁎1 ¼ argmaxp1
p1ðW  p1Þðq1  p1Þ
W
 bq1
 
¼ ðW þ q1 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðW  q1Þ2 þWq1
q
Þ=3; ð23Þ
for q1b q¯H (W). Summarizing these results we obtain
C⁎H1ðq1;W Þ ¼
W=4 bq1; if q1 z ð1þW Þ=2;
ðq1  1=2Þð1 ðq1  1=2Þ=W Þ  bq1; if q1a½q¯H; ð1þW Þ=2;
2p⁎1 ð1 p⁎1 =W Þðq1  p⁎1 Þ  bq1; otherwise:
8<
:
ð24Þ
In the case of realizationsW such that q1∈ [(1+W) /2,
1+W /2] the firm would use mixed versioning; however,
the following proposition shows that this is never optimal.
Analogous to the pure-vertical-versioning case, it can
be shown that the profit function ΠH1 is continuously
differentiable and has at most one maximum in q1N0.
Proposition 5. (i) For any given realization of W in S,
either pure horizontal or pure vertical differentiation is
optimal. (ii) Horizontal product cannibalization (overlap)
may be optimal for certain “intermediate” realizations of
W.
Horizontal overlap in the product portfolio is most
likely to be useful if the support S of demand realizations
is such that for low states W vertical differentiation is
optimal while for high states horizontal separation is
best. Note that in the presence of horizontal product
cannibalization, there generally is price dispersion (cf.
the details on the overlap case in the Appendix). Figs. 6
and 7 show the optimal firm profits and modes of ex-post
differentiation for S ¼ ½1; 2 and β=1/10.4.1.3. Effect of versioning costs
As a consequence of Proposition 5 mixed versioning
cost, αM≥αH, αV, will never be incurred. With perfect
ex-ante information about W, the effect of versioning
cost is of course adequately displayed in Fig. 5 with Ŵ
replaced by W. In the presence of uncertainty, the
optimal policy depends on the magnitudes and the
difference between αV and αH as these influence the
attractiveness of one versioning mode over the other and
of product-line extensions overall.
4.2. The product development decision
In the first stage of the versioning problem with
delayed differentiation the firm decides about the
appropriate development effort (i.e., investment in
product quality q1⁎⁎) by solving problem (20). As
pointed out in Section 1, irreversibilities in investments
lead firms to value the option of delaying commitment
[22,28,38]. Under delayed differentiation in the presence
of demand uncertainty the marginal value of quality may
be higher than under ex-ante versioning where an
adaptation of the product portfolio to the realization of
the uncertain demand is not possible.
Proposition 6. If the optimal ex-post versioning policy
is not state-contingent, i.e., the mode of differentiation
does not depend on W, then the optimal ex-ante invest-
ment q1⁎⁎ is characterized by
18
q⁎⁎1 ¼ 1þ
2
3
Z W2ðq⁎⁎1 Þ
W1ðq⁎⁎1 Þ
f ðwÞdw bþ
Z s¯
W2ðq⁎⁎1 Þ
p⁎1 ðwÞ 1
3p⁎1 ðwÞ
4w
 
f ðwÞdw
Z W2ðq⁎⁎1 Þ
W1ðq⁎⁎1 Þ
f ðwÞ
w
dw
ð25Þ
for pure vertical differentiation (with s¯ ¼ maxfSg,W1=3
(q1⁎⁎−1) /2, q¯V (W2)=q1⁎⁎, and p1⁎ as in Eq. (21) for
w=W), and
q⁎⁎1 ¼
1
2
þ
Z W2ðq⁎⁎1 Þ
W1ðq⁎⁎1 Þ
f ðwÞdw bþ 2
Z s¯
W2ðq⁎⁎1 Þ
p⁎1 ðwÞ 1
p⁎1 ðwÞ
w
 
f ðwÞdw
2
Z W2ðq⁎⁎1 Þ
W1ðq⁎⁎1 Þ
f ðwÞ
w
dw
ð26Þ
for horizontal differentiation without overlap (with s¯ as
above, W1=2q1⁎⁎−1, q¯H1** (W2)=q1⁎⁎, and p1⁎ as in
Eq. (23) for w=W).
Fig. 6. Optimal cumulative profits as a function of q1 and W (for β=1/10, S=[1, 2]).
Fig. 7. Optimalmodes of ex-post differentiation (for β=1/10, S=[1, 2]).
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is low, then [W1,W2]∩S=S, so that the expressions (25)
and (26) are identical to the optimal ex-ante quality
choice q1⁎ under vertical and horizontal differentiation
respectively (cf. Section 3.2). If the development cost β
is zero, then clearly it is optimal to vertically version and
choose q1⁎⁎=1+2s¯ /3, a quality larger than the ex-ante
optimal quality of q1⁎=1+2Ŵ/3 for β=0, since uncer-
tainty about demand implies uncertainty about the
optimal pricing of the product portfolio. Hence, even if
quality can be provided at an arbitrarily small positive
cost, a firm lacking the flexibility to version and to
reprice according to observed demand will generally
limit its flagship product's quality.
4.2.1. Example
For state-contingent versioning policies a firm's
investment in product development does not necessarily
increase. Consider the case when the support S is finite
containing only the positive elementsWL=2 andWH=4,
which correspond to a “low” and a “high” demand
realization respectively. The probability of high demand
is denoted by πH and the development cost is β=1/4.
Thus, the ex-ante demand estimator is Ŵ=4/ (2−πH),
which satisfies the viability condition (19) for all
πH∈ [0, 1]. For Ŵ less than 6β / (1−β)2 =8 /3 (i.e.,
πHb1 /2) the firm decides ex-ante to horizontally
version, whereas for πHN1 /2 vertical versioning is
optimal. Under delayed differentiation the firm prefers to
not commit to any particular mode of differentiation for a
large range of intermediate πH's. In the case of a
“surprisingly” high realization of demand the ex-antequality choice is relatively too small, so that horizontal
versioning is optimal. The converse is true for a low
demand realization, when it is better to vertically version
in order to make use of the “unexpectedly” high flagship
quality. Fig. 8 shows that the firm’s development effort
(proportional to q1) may go both up and down with
delayed differentiation as a result of actively using its
added flexibility in the form of a state-contingent
horizontal–vertical versioning policy.
4.2.2. Value of perfect information
The expected value of perfect information (EVPI)
about the demand under ex-ante versioning is simply the
difference between ex-ante optimal profit evaluated atW
Fig. 8. Optimal choice of q1 under ex-ante versioning and under delayed differentiation (for β=1 /4, S={2, 4}).
Fig. 9. Expected value of perfect information (EVPI) and value of the
option to delay differentiation (Vd) as a function of the development
cost β (for S={2, 4}, πH= .5).
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(ex-ante versioning)=EΠ⁎(W)−Π⁎(Ŵ), where
C⁎ðW Þ ¼
W ð1 bÞ2=3 b; if W z 6b=ð1 bÞ2;
W ð1 bÞ2=4 b=2; if Wa½2b=ð1 bÞ2; 6b=ð1 bÞ2;
0; otherwise:
8<
:
Clearly EVPI is an upper bound for the value of the
option to delay differentiation [9]. It is generally not
monotonic in the development cost β, as the way in
which information alters the versioning decision depends
on the firm's default no-information versioning policy.
4.2.3. Value of the option to delay differentiation
The option value of not having to commit to the
product portfolio ex ante is given by Vd=Π¯⁎⁎−Π¯⁎.
This value must be zero for large values of β, since both
Π¯⁎⁎ and Π¯⁎ are tightly bounded from below by zero and
are strictly decreasing (and continuous) in β.
Proposition 7. (i) The value of the option to delay
differentiation, Vd(β), is locally maximal at baf0; 3þð
Wˆ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
9þ 6Wˆ
p
Þ=Wˆg. (ii) Its slope with respect to the
development cost β is given almost everywhere by the
difference of the optimal flagship qualitieswith andwithout
delayed differentiation,
∂bVd ¼a:e: q⁎1  q⁎⁎1 : ð27Þ
(iii) The option value is zero for large β's.Development costs in which the firm is ex ante
indifferent between vertical and horizontal versioning
make the option to delay decisions about the composi-
tion of the product portfolio particularly valuable. A
state-contingent policy specifying the mode of differen-
tiation as a function of the realized demand clearly
outperforms the noncontingent ex-ante decision. In
particular, the value of flexibility is generally non-
Fig. 10. Consumer surplus (CS) as a function of the development cost
β (for S={2, 4}, πH= .5).
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which a deviation from the firm's default ex-ante
strategy influences expected profits. Varying the devel-
opment cost, the option value varies proportional to the
difference q1⁎−q1⁎⁎, which can be positive and negative.
Fig. 9 depicts the option value for our previous two-state
example (with S ¼ fWL;WHg) together with the
expected value of perfect information as a function of β.
4.3. Effects on consumer surplus
Consumer surplus depends directly on the firm's
product portfolio and can be directly determined from
the set Ω={(pk, qk, zk)}k=1,2.
Proposition 8. (i) Given a demand realization W and
the firm's product portfolio Ω, the consumer surplus is
given in Table 1 (ii) Under ex-ante optimal versioning,
the expected consumer surplus is given by
CS ¼
ð2þ bÞ=6; if b V b V;
ð1þ bÞ=8; if Wˆa½b V; bW;
0; otherwise:
8<
: ð28Þ
where b V¼ 3þ Wˆ  ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ9þ 6Wˆp =Wˆ and bW ¼ 1þ Wˆﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ 2Wˆ
p Þ Wˆ .
The first part of Proposition 8 describes how
consumer surplus can be determined from the results in
Sections 4.1 and 4.2. The second part shows that under
ex-ante differentiation consumer surplus is piecewise
linearly increasing in β. At the points of discontinuity β′
and β″, where the first mode of differentiation changes
and then the firm decides not to enter the market,
consumer surplus drastically decreases. For each given
versioning mode, consumer surplus is increasing in βTable 1
Expected consumer surplus given a two-element product portfolio Ω
Mode of differentiation Consumer surplus [uk=qk−pk, δ=p1−p2]
Vertical W  p2
W
ðu1 minfu1; 1g=2Þminfu1; 1g
Horizontal
(separation)
W  p1
W
u1 min u1; 12
 
=2
 
min u1;
1
2
 
Horizontal
(overlap)
W  p1
W
u1  1 d4
 
1 d
2
þW  p2
W
u2  1þ d4
 
1þ d
2
þ d
W
u2 minfu2; 1g2
 
minfu2; 1gbecause the firm compensates for its decreasing quality
investment by reducing price so as to ensure a large
participation. In fact, expected market penetration19
increases between two and four times faster than con-
sumer surplus.
As shown above, the firm generally values versioning
flexibility, which may both increase or decrease the
optimal ex-ante quality investment depending on the no-
information default strategy. Interestingly, the increased
profitability of the firm's investment does not always
imply a decrease in consumer surplus. For low devel-
opment cost, the benefits of the higher flagship quality
may outweigh the firm's improved ability to screen the
consumer base, leading for low β's to a higher consumer
surplus under delayed differentiation than under ex-ante
versioning (cf. Fig. 10).
4.4. Generalization to goods with positive marginal
costs
A generalization of virtually all results in this paper to
goods with positive marginal costs cN0 can be achieved
via a simple variable transformation. The only restrictive
assumption is that the marginal costs for both goods be
the same. This is realistic for many products, and
especially those where the actual versioning decision can
be taken far downstream in the supply chain [1], e.g., by
the retailer. Replacing the prices pk in Section 3 by the
markups mk=pk−c (for k=1, 2), together with using the
constants Ŵc=Ŵ−c and βc=βŴ / (Ŵ−c) is enough for19 Expected market penetration under ex-ante versioning is (1+β) /
2∈ [1 /2, 1] for a horizontally and (2+β) / 3∈ [2 /3, 1] for a vertically
differentiated optimal product portfolio.
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ing to carry over to the case with cN0. Under delayed
differentiation the same change of variables can be used;
the estimator Ŵ needs only to be replaced by the actual
demand realization W. In addition, the firm needs to
consider q′1=q1−c for its second-stage versioning
decision. Again all of the maximizers can be simply
recovered by substituting the new constants. The overall
effect of these transformations is that positive marginal
costs are equivalent to increasing the development costs
and also add an additional fixed cost of entry, changing
the firm’s viability requirements for market entry.
5. Conclusion and further research
Even when a company can extend its product line by
varying horizontal and vertical attributes of a flagship
product, it is – given our assumptions of quasilinear
preferences and homogeneous consumer distribution –
not optimal to do both at the same time.20 This finding is
independent of the versioning cost structure, as long as
αM≥αV, αH. Nevertheless, under delayed differentiation
the firm's optimal versioning policy contingent on the
demand realization generally incorporates both modes of
differentiation. For low demand realizations it is best to
differentiate vertically, adding a product of degraded
quality to the then relatively high-performance flagship
product to more adequately segment the consumer base
by maintaining full horizontal market coverage. This can
be accomplished by deliberately “damaging” the flagship
product [11] to increase the product portfolio. On the
other hand, for (unexpectedly) large demand realizations
horizontal differentiation is generally superior, since the
effective flagship product quality may not be high
enough to guarantee full horizontal market coverage. For
intermediate realizations of demand, horizontal product
cannibalization may be the best compromise. The latter
generally implies price dispersion for products of equal
quality. Despite the quite general insight from option
theory that added flexibility usually leads to an increase
of a firm's ex-ante investment which has become “less
irreversible,” we find that for multiattribute versioning
the upfront product development efforts may decrease if,
due to the possibility of delayed differentiation, a policy
contingent on the demand state becomes optimal. This
result is driven by the nonconvexity of the problem,20 This finding cannot be expected to hold for product portfolios
with more than two products, the treatment of which in our
framework poses significant analytical difficulties. It is also not
necessarily what is observed in practice (cf. footnote 1).horizontal and vertical differentiation yielding locally
optimal profits.21
Examining the option value of delayed differentiation
further, we show that it contains a local maximum at the
point of ex-ante indifference between the versioning
modes, and that it naturally vanishes for very high
product development costs. The effect of delayed
differentiation on consumer surplus is mixed. Under
ex-ante versioning consumer surplus heavily depends on
the mode of differentiation used, and for each mode is
monotonically increasing in the firm's development cost,
as the firm tends to compensate an increase in quality
cost β by lowering price and enlarging the consumer
base. If differentiation is delayed, the versioning modes
switch at different points, so that effects on consumer
surplus are ambiguous. Overall it tends to decrease as the
firm's ability to make effective pricing and product-line-
extension decisions greatly increases.
Future research could proceed along the following
three promising axes: (1) extend the approach to more
than two products. One of the main challenges here is
that the potentially multiple overlaps are hard to capture
analytically; (2) admit more general cost functions and
demand distributions; and (3) incorporate competitive
dynamics into the multiattribute versioning decision.
Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) This part is trivial. (ii) The
probability density of W is by assumption given by the
Lebesgue-measurable function f∈L1(S). Thus, we have
using Fubini's theorem:
W¯
Wˆ
¼
Z
S
xf ðxÞdx
  Z
S
f ð yÞ
y
dy
 
¼
Z
SS
x
y
f ðxÞf ð yÞdðx; yÞ
¼
Z
SS
1
2
x
y
þ y
x
 
f ðxÞf ðyÞdðx; yÞ
N
Z
SS
f ðxÞf ðyÞdðx; yÞ ¼ 1;
since (x /y+y /x) /2N1 for all x, yN0 with x≠y. Note that
the set of points (x, y)≫0 where x=y is of measure zero
in S  S, so that the strict inequality is warranted. □21 From a technical point of view, the maximizer (i.e., the “optimal
policy”) is upper semicontinuous, essentially as a consequence of the
continuity of the objective function. This is guaranteed by Berge's
maximum theorem [5].
462 T.A. Weber / Decision Support Systems 44 (2008) 447–468Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Since there is no overlap,
the expected profits under horizontal differentiation (16)
are under separation
C¯H1ðp1; p2Þ ¼
1
2Wˆ
ðp1ðWˆ  p1Þð1 p1 þ p2Þ
þ p2ðWˆ  p2Þð1þ p1  p2ÞÞ
 bð1þ p1 þ p2Þ=2:
Note that Π¯H1(p1, p2)=Π¯H1(p2, p1) and therefore,
if there is an asymmetric maximizer, there must be at least
two of them. Hence, without loss of generality, assume
that p1≥p2. Let us now introduce the variable δ=p1−
p2∈ [0, 1], which leads to the problem of maximizing
C¯H1ð p2 þ d; p2Þ ¼ 
p22
Wˆ
þ 1 b dð1 dÞ
Wˆ
 
p2
þ 1
2
dð1 dÞ 1 d
Wˆ
 
bð1þ dÞ
 
with respect to p2∈ [0, Ŵ] and δ∈ [0, 1], subject to the
additional constraint 0≤p2+δ≤Ŵ. Neglecting the latter
constraint, the first-order condition with respect to p2 is
∂p2C¯H1ðp2 þ d; p2Þ ¼ 
2p
Wˆ
þ 1 b dð1 dÞ
Wˆ
¼ 0, which yields
p⁎2 ðdÞ ¼ Wˆ2 ð1 bÞ  dð1dÞ2 V W2 ð1 bÞ. Thus,
C¯H1ðp⁎2 ðdÞ þ d; p⁎2 ðdÞÞ ¼
Wˆ
4
ð1 bÞ2  b
2
 d
2
4Wˆ
ð1 d2 þ 2bWˆ Þ
V
Wˆ
4
ð1 bÞ2  b
2
:
The last inequality is binding if and only if δ=0. The
unique maximizers of the original maximization in the
“separation” case, now satisfying all of the above
constraints, are p⁎1 ¼ p⁎2 ¼ Wˆ2 ð1 bÞ, yielding optimal
profits
C¯⁎H1 ¼
Wˆ
4
ð1 bÞ2  b
2
¼ C¯⁎1 þ
b
2
: ð29Þ
These profits are by the amount β / 2 larger than
profits for the single-product monopoly and are positive
(i.e., viable) if and only if
Wˆ N
2b
ð1 bÞ2 : ð30Þ
In particular, a multiproduct monopolist firm can
substitute horizontal differentiation for a quality in-
crease, and save on cost (provided that αHbβ / 2).(ii) When there is overlap, the expected profit
function (16) becomes
C¯H2ðp1; p2Þ ¼
1
2Wˆ
ðp1ðWˆ  p1Þð1 p1 þ p2Þ
þ p2ðWˆ  p2Þð1þ p1  p2Þ
þmaxfp1ð p2  p1Þ; p2ðp1  p2Þg
 ð1 p1 þ p2ÞÞ  bð1þ p2Þ:
The single-product monopoly profits Π¯1⁎ are attained
for p1=p2 and p1=p2+1. As pointed out above, p1≥p2.
Let us again introduce δ=p1−p2∈ [0, 1]. Then
C¯H2ðp2 þ d; p2Þ ¼ 
p22
Wˆ
þ 1 b dð1 dÞ
2Wˆ
 
p2
þ dð1 dÞ
2
1 d
Wˆ
 
 b:
The first-order condition with respect to p2,
∂p2 Π¯H2( p2+ δ, p2)=0, yields p
⁎
2 ðdÞ ¼ Wˆ2 ð1 bÞ  dð1 dÞ4 ,
and therefore
C¯H2ðp⁎2 ðdÞ þ d; p⁎2 ðdÞÞ ¼
Wˆ
4
ð1 bÞ2  b
 dð1 dÞ
16Wˆ
d2 þ 7d 4Wˆ ð1þ bÞ 
¼ C¯⁎1 þ
dð1 dÞ
16Wˆ
ðd dÞðdþ  dÞ;
ð31Þ
where dF ¼ 7F
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
49þ 16Wˆ ð1þ bÞ
q 
=2. It is δ−b0bδ+, and
therefore C¯⁎H2 in expression (31) is greater than C¯
⁎
H2
if and
only if 0bδbmin{δ+, 1}. The following lemma helps
establishing that the optimal profit C¯⁎H2 is strictly inferior
to maxfC¯⁎H1 ; C¯
⁎
Vg. In other words, if pure horizontal
differentiation is superior to pure vertical differentiation,
then separation will maximize profits.
Lemma 2. Let the parameters 0bβb1 andŴ be given.
Then for any δ∈ [0, 1]:
dð1 dÞðd dÞðdþ  dÞ bmaxf8bWˆ ; ð2Wˆ ð1 bÞÞ2=3g:
ð32Þ
Proof. Let d¯ ¼ minf1; dþg. As the RHS of Eq. (32) is
always positive, we can limit ourselves to daI ¼ ½0; d¯
for which the LHS is nonnegative. Set f(δ) to be equal to
the LHS of Eq. (32). Since f is a polynomial with a set of
roots {δ−, 0, δ+, 1}, where d b 0 b d¯, it is
max
daI
j f VðdÞj ¼ max f f Vð0Þ;f Vðd¯Þg:
ð31Þ
22 δ¯=1 is equivalent to Eq. (34), which slightly restricts the relevant
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fact that f ″|Ib0, for all δ∈ I:
f ðdÞ Vminf f Vð0Þdd;f Vðd¯Þðd¯  dÞg V f Vðd¯Þf Vð0Þdd¯
f Vð0Þ  f Vðd¯Þ :
ð33Þ
Thereby f ′(0)=−δ−δ+ and − f ′(δ¯ )=max{δ+(δ+−δ−)
(1−δ+), (1−δ−)(δ+−1)}. Let us first consider the case
when δ¯ =1, or equivalently
Wˆ ð1þ bÞz 2: ð34Þ
Then by Eq. (33)
f ðdÞ V ddþð1 dÞðdþ  1Þddþ þ ð1 dÞðdþ  1Þ
¼ 16Wˆ ð1þ bÞðWˆ ð1þ bÞ  2Þ
4Wˆ ð1þ bÞ þ 4ðWˆ ð1þ bÞ  2Þ
¼ 2Wˆ ð1þ bÞðWˆ ð1þ bÞ  2Þ
Wˆ ð1þ bÞ  1 :
ð35Þ
One can verify by straightforward manipulations that
the RHS of Eq. (35) is less than 8βŴ if and only if
Wˆ ð1 3bÞ b 2 1 b
1þ b ;
which establishes inequality (32) for all
ðb; Wˆ ÞaD1¼ ð ̆b;W̆ Þ : 0 b ̆b b 13 ;W̆ b
1 ̆b
ð1þ ̆bÞð1 3 ̆bÞ
( )
[ ð½1=3; 1Þ  ð0;lÞÞ:
On the other hand, one can verify that the RHS of
Eq. (35) is less than (2Ŵ (1−β)2 / 3 if and only if
2
1þ bþ
2
3
ð1 bÞ2
1þ b Wˆ
2  2
3
1 b
1þ b
 2
þ1
 !
Wˆ N0:
ð36Þ
Restricting β to the interval (0, 1 /3], inequality (36)
is satisfied if
3þ ð1 bÞ2Wˆ 2  ð1 bÞ
2
1þ b þ
3
2
ð1þ bÞ
 !
Wˆ
z 3þ 2
3
ð1bÞWˆ  ð1 bÞ
2
1þ b þ
3
2
ð1þ bÞ
 !" #
Wˆ N0:
ð35ÞThe expression in square brackets can be further
minorized by setting β=1 /3, based on the fact that the
derivative of that expression with respect to β,
 4
3
1
1þ b
4
3
1 b
ð1þ bÞ2 þ 2
1 b
1þ bþ
ð1 bÞ2
ð1þ bÞ2 
3
2
is negative on (0, 1 /3]. In particular,
3þ Wˆ 2
3
ð1 bÞWˆ  ð1 bÞ
2
1þ b þ
3
2
ð1þ bÞ
 !" #
b¼1=3
¼ 1
9
ðWˆ  3Þð4Wˆ  9ÞN0
implies Eq. (32) for all (β,Ŵ)∈D2= (0, 1 /3]× ((0, 9 / 4)
⋃ (3, ∞)). Alternately one can minorize the RHS of
Eq. (36) by substituting
Wˆ ¼ 2ð1 bÞ
2 þ 3ð1þ bÞ2
4ð1 bÞ2ð1þ bÞ ;
its unique minimizer. Relation (36) is satisfied for a
given β∈ (0, 1 /3) and all ŴN0 if
23b4  20b3  150b2  20bþ 23N0:
The last polynomial has the set of approximate roots
{−2.0221,− .4945, .3269, 3.0593}, so that Eq. (32) follows
for (β, Ŵ)∈D3=(0, 3/10)×(0, ∞). Since D1⋃D2⋃D3=
(0, 1)×(0,∞), we have indeed shown that Eq. (32) holds for
all relevant22 (β, Ŵ) whenever δ¯ =1. Let us now examine
the case when δ¯ =δ+b1 or in other words
0 b Wˆ b
2
1þ b : ð37Þ
Using Eq. (33) write
f ðdÞ V dd
3
þðdþ  dÞð1 dþÞ
ddþ þ dþðdþ  dÞð1 dþÞ
b
d2þðdþ  dÞð1 dþÞ
2 dþ
¼ 1
4
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
49þ 16gp ð9þ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ49þ 16gp Þð7þ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ49þ 16gp Þ2
11þ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ49þ 16gp ;
ð38Þ
where η=Ŵ(1+β) and by Eq. (37) it is 0bηb2.
Straightforward computations yield that expression
(38) is less than 8βŴ=8η(1−1 / (1+β)) if and only if
ðb; gÞaE1 ¼ fð ̆b; ̆gÞ : 0 b ̆b b R1ð ̆gÞ; 0 b ̆g b 2g; ð39Þdomain of (β, Ŵ) to a subset of (0, 1)×(0, ∞).
23 This follows from the fact that the discriminant Δ=(P2−4R−4P2 /
3) /3)3+(16P3 /27−2P(P2−4R) /3−Q2)2 /4 is negative in the relevant
domain, which can be verified numerically.
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R1ðgÞ ¼ ð2g3  153g2  537g 294Þ1ð2g3 þ 279g2
þ 306g 1764þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
49þ 16g
p
ð15gþ 12g2
 294Þ þ ½4032g5 þ 70; 620g4  91; 110g3
 1; 744; 848g2  444; 528gþ 7; 260; 624
þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
49þ 16g
p
ð48g5 þ 6756g4 þ 14; 538g3
 197; 208g2  232; 848gþ 1; 037; 232Þ1=2Þ:
On the other hand, expression (38) is less than (2Ŵ(1+
β))2 /3=4η2(1−4/(1+β)+4/ (1+β)2 /3 if and only if
ðb; gÞaE2 ¼ fð ̆b; ğÞ : R2ð ğÞ b ̆b b 1; 0 b ğ b 2g; ð40Þ
where
R2ðgÞ ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
49þ 16gp ð23gþ 98Þ  16g2  273g 686
16g2 þ 295gþ 686 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ49þ 16gp ð25gþ 98Þ :
Since R1(η)NR2(η) for all 0bηb2, it is E1⋃E2=(0,
1)×(0, 2), and therefore Eq. (32) holds also for the case
that δ¯ =δ+, which concludes the proof of Lemma 2. □
As mentioned before, based on Lemma 2 as well as
Eqs. (10), (29), and (31) pure horizontal differentiation
in the overlap mode is strictly dominated by either pure
vertical differentiation or pure horizontal differentiation
in the separation mode. This concludes the proof of
Proposition 3. □
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) For zero versioning costs,
condition (19) is necessary and sufficient, since the
viability domains of single-product monopoly, pure
vertical differentiation, and mixed differentiation are
subsets of the region of positive profits for pure hori-
zontal differentiation in separation mode, given precisely
by Eq. (19). Thus, if the latter condition is satisfied there
exists εN0 such that αH∈ [0, ε] is small enough for the
resulting profits to be positive. (ii) This is an immediate
consequence of Eq. (19) being necessary and sufficient
for viability under zero versioning costs. (iii) From
Ŵ∈ (2β / (1−β)2, 4β / (1−β)2) it follows that a single-
product monopoly is not viable according to Eq. (7),
while at the same time Eq. (19) is satisfied. □
Details on the horizontal-overlap case under delayed
differentiation. Since q1≥q2, we have that necessarily
p1≥p2, which generally implies price dispersion for
goods of equal quality. In the following it is useful to
distinguish three cases. (i) If q1−p2b1, then q1−p1b1
and q2−p2b1. We can conclude that p1, p2∈ [q1−1,q1] or in other words that p1−p2b1. Thus, q1=q2 (pure
horizontal differentiation). The profit-maximization
problem is
ð p1; p2Þ ¼ arg max
p1;p2
fp1ðW  p1Þð1 p1 þ p2Þ
2W
þ p2ð p1  p2Þðq1  p2Þ
W
þ p2ðW  p1Þð1þ p1  p2Þ
2W
g
¼ argmax
p1;p2
fW  p1
2W
ð p1 þ p2  ð p1  p2Þ2Þ
þ p2ð p1  p2Þðq1  p2Þ
W
g: ð41Þ
Setting δ=p1−p2∈ [0, 1] it is possible to rewrite the
profit function as
CH2ð p2 þ d; dÞ ¼
ðW  p2  dÞð2p2  dð1 dÞÞ þ 2p2dðq1  p2Þ
2W
 bq1:
Any interior extremum satisfies the necessary optimal-
ity condition for p2, from which we obtain
p⁎2 ðdÞ ¼
2W þ dð2ðq1  1Þ  ð1 dÞÞ
4ð1þ dÞ :
By substituting this expression, the profit function ΠH2
can be expressed as a function of δ only, and the first-
order condition with respect to δ is
ad4 þ bd3 þ cd2 þ ddþ e ¼ 0; ð42Þ
with a=27 /16, b=(q1+3) /2−W, c=(q12−5W) / 4−17 /
16, d=(q1
2−3q1+W) / 2+1 /8, and e=−W(W+1−2q1) /
4. To analytically find the roots of this fourth-order
polynomial we follow Ref. [7]. Substituting y=δ+b /
(4a), Eq. (42) can be written equivalently in the reduced
form
y4 þ Py2 þ Qyþ R ¼ 0; ð43Þ
where P=(c /a)−3b2 / 8a2, Q=d /a−cb /a2 +b3 / 8a3,
and R=e /a+(cb2 /16−db / 4) /a2−3b4 /256a4. The so-
lution behavior of Eq. (43) depends on the behavior of
its resolvent cubic,
z3 þ 2Pz2 þ ðP2  4RÞz Q2;
the roots of which are all real23 and given by zk=2ρ cos (φ /
3+2(k−1)π /3), for k=1, 2, 3, with q ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
4P2  3Q
p
=3
and φ=arccos ((2P(P2−4R) /3+Q2−16P3 /27) / (2ρ3)).
ð41Þ
465T.A. Weber / Decision Support Systems 44 (2008) 447–468From this, the roots of the reduced-form polynomial in Eq.
(43) can be computed to
y1 ¼ ð ﬃﬃﬃﬃz1p þ ﬃﬃﬃﬃz2p  ﬃﬃﬃﬃz3p Þ=2;
y2 ¼ ð ﬃﬃﬃﬃz1p  ﬃﬃﬃﬃz2p þ ﬃﬃﬃﬃz3p Þ=2;
y3 ¼ ð ﬃﬃﬃﬃz1p þ ﬃﬃﬃﬃz2p þ ﬃﬃﬃﬃz3p Þ=2;
y4 ¼ ð ﬃﬃﬃﬃz1p  ﬃﬃﬃﬃz2p  ﬃﬃﬃﬃz3p Þ=2;
and a local maximizer of ΠH2 (p2⁎(δ)+δ, p2⁎(δ)) is
d⁎ ¼ y1  b4a ; ð44Þ
as the second-order condition is satisfied at that point.24
(ii) If q1−p2≥1, then the optimization problem is
ðp1; p2Þ ¼ arg max
p1 ;p2
fp1ðW  p1Þð1 p1 þ p2Þ
2W
þ p2ð p1  p2Þ
W
þ p2ðW  p1Þð1þ p1  p2Þ
2W
g
¼ argmax
p1;p2
fW  p1
2
ð p1 þ p2  ð p1  p2Þ2Þ
þp2ð p1  p2Þg: ð45Þ
The quality q2 is actually indeterminate in [1+p2, q1],
but without loss of generality we set q2=q1 (which is true
for even very small positive versioning cost). Note that
p1−p2≤1, otherwise there is only one product. Also, this
case is equivalent to the corresponding ex-ante version-
ing situation for β=0. Introducing δ=p1−p2∈ [0, 1], we
obtain
CH2ð p2 þ d; dÞ ¼
ðW  p2  dÞð2p2 þ d d2Þ þ 2p2d
2W
 bq1:
Assuming that there is an interior extremum the first-
order condition with respect to p2 is
2W  4p2  dð1 dÞ ¼ 0;
so that p⁎(δ)=W / 2−δ(1−δ) / 4. The resulting expres-
sion for the profits under horizontal versioning with
overlap is
CH2ðdÞ ¼
W
4
 bq1 þ dð1 dÞðd dÞðdþ  dÞ16W ;
ð46Þ
where dF ¼ ð7F
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
16W þ 49p Þ=2. The first-order con-
dition with respect to δ is then
d3 þ 9
2
d2  2W þ 7
2
 
dþW ¼ 0: ð47Þ
Using the cardanic formula to solve the cubic equation
(47) it turns out that for any W there are three real roots,24 An analytical test of the second-order condition is complicated,
but it can be readily verified numerically.of which only one is associated with an interior
maximum of the fourth-order polynomial at Eq. (46),
d⁎ðW Þ ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
8W þ 41
3
r
sin
k
6
 1
3
arccos
48ðW þ 3Þﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð8W þ 41Þ3=3
q
0
B@
1
CA
0
B@
1
CA 3
2
:
ð48Þ
It is δ⁎(W)∈ [0, 1 / 2] strictly increasing in W with
δ⁎(0)=0 and limW→∞ δ⁎(W)=1 /2.
(iii) In the intermediary case with binding constraint,
q1−p2=1, the optimization problem is identical to (45),
subject to p2=q1−1,
CH2ðdÞ ¼
ðW  ðq1  1ÞÞðq1  1Þ
W
 bq1
þ dð1 dÞðA dÞ
2W
with the abbreviation A=W− (q1−1). The first-order
necessary optimality condition is 3δ2−2(A+1)δ+A=0,
and the maximizer is therefore
d⁎ ¼ Aþ 1
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
A2  Aþ 1p
3
: ð49Þ
The second-order condition is satisfied here, since
CH2W ðd⁎Þ ¼ 2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
A2  Aþ 1p b 0. This concludes our H2
analytical discussion of the horizontal-overlap case
under delayed differentiation. □
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) It is sufficient to show that
the profit function under mixed ex-post differentiation
is dominated by pure horizontal differentiation with
overlap. Let ( p1, q1) be such that 1 / 2≤q1−p1b1.
Under horizontal separation (in which the local mixed-
differentiation optimum occurs) this implies that q1−
p1=1− (q2−p2)b1, and furthermore, as shown in
Section 4.1, then p1⁎=p2⁎=W / 2. Thus, also q1−p2⁎b1
so that we can compare the profit function under
horizontal separation to the maximand in Eq. (41)
discussed earlier in this Appendix for the case that q1−
p2b1. Subtracting the latter from the former yields −p1
(W−p1) (1− (q1−p2)) / 2−p2(W−p2)(q1−p2)−p2( p1−
p2)(q1−p2)(q1−p2)b0, so that mixed differentiation is
strictly dominated. (ii) The claim that horizontal
cannibalization is sometimes optimal can be shown
by example and thus Fig. 7 is sufficient as a proof. It
is not optimal for large q1 (compared to W), since it
can be shown analogously to the computation in part
(i) that pure vertical differentiation is globally better.
466 T.A. Weber / Decision Support Systems 44 (2008) 447–468For q1 small compared to W horizontal overlap cannot
be achieved. Thus, horizontal overlap can only be best
for “intermediate” realizations of W. This concludes the
Proof of Proposition 5. □
Proof of Proposition 6. Assume first that ex post pure
vertical differentiation is optimal, independent of the
demand realization W. Then differentiating the expres-
sion (22) for ΠV⁎(q1; W) and then taking the expectation
with respect to W yields25
 bþ
Z W2
W1
1 3ðq
⁎⁎
1  1Þ
2w
 
f ðwÞdw
þ
Z s¯
W2
p⁎1 1
3p⁎1
4w
 
f ðwÞdw ¼ 0;
where W1, W2, p1⁎, and s¯ are as the corresponding part
of Proposition 6. The last equation is equivalent to
Eq. (25). Next assume that ex post pure vertical
differentiation is optimal, independent of the demand
realization W. As before we determine the first-order
condition by first taking the derivative of ΠH1(q1; W) in
Eq. (24) with respect to q1 and then taking the
expectation with respect to W. This yields
 bþ
Z W2
W1
1 2q
⁎⁎
1  1
w
 
f ðwÞdw
þ 2
Z s¯
W2
p⁎1 1
p⁎1
w
 
f ðwÞdw ¼ 0;
which is equivalent to Eq. (26) using the definitions of
W1, W2, p1⁎⁎, and s¯ as in the corresponding part of
Proposition 6. □
Proof of Proposition 7. (ii) By Berge's maximum
theorem [5] the option value Vd is continuous in β as
difference of two continuous functions Π¯ ⁎⁎ and Π¯ ⁎.
Also as a consequence of the maximum theorem both
maximizers q1⁎⁎ and q1⁎ are generally set-valued and
upper semicontinuous in the parameter β. The max-
imizers are set-valued if and only if the firm is indif-
ferent between several different q1-values. Let ŴN0 be
given. Following our developments in Section 3, q1⁎(β),
0≤β≤1, is given by
q⁎1 ðbÞ ¼
1þ 2Wˆ ð1 bÞ=3; if bz b V;
1=2þ Wˆ ð1 bÞ=2; if ba½b V; bW;
0; otherwise;
8<
:25 This means to switch differentiation and integration when
determining the first-order conditions of the optimization problem
(20). This naturally presupposes sufficient regularity of the probability
density function f.where b V¼ 3þ Wˆ  ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ9þ 6Wˆp =Wˆ and bW ¼ 1þ Wˆﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ 2Wˆ
p
Þ= Wˆ . Only for β∈{β′, β″} is q1⁎ possibly
set-valued; on [0, β″) \ {β′} it is strictly monotonically
decreasing. Similarly, the optimal flagship quality under
delayed differentiation, q1⁎⁎, can only be set-valued at
0bβ1, β2, β3b1, where β1≤β′bβ2bβ″≤β3, corre-
sponding to the vertical-contingent (β1), contingent-
horizontal (β2), and horizontal-no entry (β3) mode
transitions. We have noted in Section 4 that expressions
(22) and (24) are continuously differentiable in q1. The
same is true for the corresponding expression in the
overlap mode. In fact, these expressions are twice
continuously differentiable (“smooth”) almost every-
where, and thus the envelope theorem can be applied in
the smooth portions, so that we obtain relation (27).
(i) At β=β′ the firm is indifferent between horizontal
and vertical versioning modes. But if the firm can
observe demand W=Ŵ before taking the versioning
decision,26 then it generally will not be indifferent
between horizontal and vertical differentiation, so that a
state-contingent policy of intermediate ex-ante quality
will at least weakly increase profits at β=β′. As a
consequence, q1⁎⁎ (β′)∈ (q1⁎ (β′+), q1⁎ (β′−)) so that
with Eq. (27) we obtain a local maximum of Vd at β=β′,
in other words a state-contingent policy will generally
improve profits around β′. Consider now β=0. Then
q1⁎⁎(0)=1+2s¯ / 3 with s¯ =max fSg. On the other hand,
it is following Section 3.2: q1⁎(0)=1+2Ŵ / 3≤q1⁎⁎(0)
because generally s¯ ≥Ŵ. (iii) This part is trivial: for
β≥β3, β″, the firm does not enter the market and thus
the option of being able to delay differentiation is not
worth anything. □
Proof of Proposition 8. (i) Consider first the case of
pure vertical differentiation. Consumer surplus CSV is
then
CSV ¼ 1W
Z minfu1;1g
0
½ðu1  vÞðw p1Þ þ ðu1  vÞdv
¼ W  p2
W
u1v v
2
2
 minfu1;1g
0
;
an expression equivalent to the first entry in Table 1.
The consumer surplus for pure horizontal differentia-
tion with separation follows in the same manner. We26 If W=Ŵ (which can only happen with positive probability for
certain “pathological” discrete distributions of W), then the firm might
be indifferent between horizontal and vertical versioning modes, even
under delayed differentiation.
467T.A. Weber / Decision Support Systems 44 (2008) 447–468now turn to the case to horizontal differentiation with
overlap, for which the consumer surplus can be com-
puted as follows:
CSH2 ¼
W  p1
W
þW  p2
W
Z 1þp1p2
2
0
ðu2  vÞdv
þ p1  p2
W
Z minfu1;1g
0
ðu2  vÞdv:
Using the abbreviation δ=p1−p2, we obtain the third
expression in Table 1 by straightforward integration.
(ii) Substituting the ex-ante optimal product portfolio
determined in Section 3 into the first two expressions for
consumer surplus in Table 1, one immediately obtains
Eq. (28). □
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